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INTRODUCTION
1

2

He wears an Omega watch, drives an Aston Martin car, drinks
3
Smirnoff vodka, and toasts with Bollinger Champagne. As the image
of the suave James Bond comes to mind, consider: are James Bond
films purely entertainment, or are they another form of commercial
4
advertisement? These films show just one example of how our
modern media environment blurs the line between commercial
5
advertisements and entertainment works.
Technological advancements in media and the rise of product
6
placement advertising make it nearly impossible to determine
whether media producers are feeding us information for advertising

1. See Derrick Daye & Brad VanAuken, James Bond Brand Shaken By Product
Placement, BRANDING STRATEGY INSIDER, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.branding
strategyinsider.com/2008/10/james-bond-shak.html (noting that James Bond
“has been wearing an Omega watch since 1995’s Goldeneye, when the brand started
paying for product placement”).
2. See id. (explaining that consumers link the James Bond character to Aston
Martin automobiles).
3. See Lacey Rose, James Bond: Licensed to Sell, FORBES.COM, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/16/bond-movie-advertising-tech-media-cx_lr_
1116bond.html (pointing out that Smirnoff vodka is just one of many product
placement advertisements associated with the James Bond films).
4. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) (rev. ed., 2009) (attempting to distinguish
works that are commercial from works that are “entertainment works used for their
own sake”).
5. See Rose, supra note 3 (explaining that Sony’s focus on highlighting a few key
products throughout the James Bond film, Casino Royale, “reflects a larger trend in
Hollywood” to find increasingly more creative ways to promote products in their
entertainment works); see also id. (highlighting that companies were likely to spend
3.07 billion dollars in paid placement advertising in 2006, which was up thirty-nine
percent from 2005).
6. See Stephanie Clifford, Bravo Shows Move Further Into Licensing Products,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at B3 (revealing that Bravo will increase the amount of
products it includes in its shows and will begin to receive a percentage of the sales of
those products).
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7

purposes or creative expression for our thoughtful consideration.
Despite this difficulty, the ability to separate entertainment from
commercial advertising is a critical element in a recently proposed
8
solution to a long-standing dilemma in copyright law put forth by
9
copyright expert David Nimmer.
Nimmer relies on this entertainment and commercial distinction
in his framework for deciding when a federal copyright claim should
10
11
preempt a competing state right of publicity claim.
Right of
publicity laws allow celebrities to retain a property interest in the
commercial use of their personalities, an interest that can conflict
12
with the rights of copyright owners. However, as the James Bond
films demonstrate, it is increasingly difficult to determine whether a
work is made for a commercial or entertainment purpose.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has a clear standard to
determine when a federal copyright claim should trump a state right
13
of publicity claim. The ongoing failure to clarify preemption in
7. See Amit M. Schejter, Product Placement as an International Practice: Moral,
Legal, Regulatory and Trade Implications, 3 (Oct. 2004), http://web.si.umich.edu/
tprc/papers/2004/304/product%20placement%20tprc.pdf (mentioning that “[t]he
Center for Media & Democracy calls it a ‘[f]orm of advertisement, without disclosing
it to the receiving party’”).
8. See infra Part I.C (discussing David Nimmer’s proposed test for solving
copyright preemption by categorizing copyrighted works as those used for
entertainment purposes or those used merely for commercial advertisements).
9. See, e.g., Schuyler Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 201, 203 (2002) (explaining that “[t]he treatise Nimmer on Copyright is the
bible of copyright law . . . [and] it is rare to find a decision dealing with copyright
where that treatise is not cited.”). David Nimmer is the son of the late Melville B.
Nimmer who first published the Nimmer on Copyright Treatise in 1963. Irell &
Manella LLP, David Nimmer, http://www.irell.com/professionals-51.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009). Since 1985, David Nimmer has continued to update and revise
the treatise created by his father. Id.
10. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 243 (1998) (equating the term
preempting with superseding, and explaining that the Supreme Court sets forth
multiple tests to determine if a federal law should supersede a competing state law
claim).
11. See infra Part I.C (outlining Nimmer’s preemption test, which asks courts to
distinguish between commercial and entertainment uses of a copyrighted work).
12. See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2005)
(weighing the right of a celebrity to control the use of her photograph with the right
of the copyright owner of the photo to use it on a bottle of hair care product);
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (disputing the right of George Wendt to limit production of copyrighted
animatronic figures of his Cheers character); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
462 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing Bette Midler’s right of publicity interest to defeat a
copyright owner’s interest in producing a song that mimicked her voice).
13. See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2007) (“[T]here are literally
hundreds of federal and state decisions interpreting this [copyright preemption]
provision, which can charitably be described as inconsistent and even incoherent.”).
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copyright law threatens to undermine the uniform application of
14
federal copyright law, and it may reduce the incentive for
15
individuals to produce copyrighted works.
16
Despite the need for clarity in the copyright-preemption debate,
this Comment will argue that courts should not rely on Nimmer’s
preemption framework because it does not promote the objectives of
the Constitution or provide a consistent method to determine when a
federal copyright claim should defeat an opposing right of publicity
claim. Instead, courts should incorporate elements from trademark
law’s test for similarity to resolve copyright-preemption disputes.
This Comment will demonstrate the problems with Nimmer’s
framework by focusing on the United States Court of Appeals for the
17
Third Circuit’s decision in Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc.
Given the
18
ambiguous state of preemption in copyright law and the discrepancy
19
across courts, the Third Circuit could not turn to consistent case
precedent when it faced this duel between the state and federal
20
claims.
The court, therefore, relied primarily on Nimmer’s
proposed solution to this preemption issue to decide if a copyright
21
claim should withstand the competing state right of publicity claim.
14. See id. at 23 (explaining that the Copyright Act seeks to provide uniform
rights to all copyright owners, but the conflicting outcomes across circuit courts with
relation to preemption claims serve to undermine this goal).
15. Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 199, 212 (2002) (arguing that upholding right of publicity claims
severely harms copyright holders because it undermines their ability to produce
derivative works, which, in turn, “limits both their creative potential and their ability
to fund their work”).
16. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 23 (noting that the different outcomes courts
reach when applying the preemption doctrine is contradictory to the purpose of the
Copyright Act).
17. 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
18. See infra Part I.A.3 (explaining how the lack of clarity within the language of
the preemption clause of the Copyright Act leads to conflicting ideas of when state
rights should be preempted).
19. See Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World,
1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 24 (1995), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v1i1/hardy.html
(pointing out that, even though the authors of the Copyright Act included the
preemption clause in an effort to avoid any confusion as to preemption, the
preemption doctrine “has experienced at best an inconsistent interpretation by the
courts”).
20. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029 (beginning the analysis of the conflict
preemption claim by outlining Nimmer’s framework rather than relying on case
law).
21. The court reasoned:
Does a contract acknowledging a right-of-publicity for defendant’s copyright
in a work containing a plaintiff’s identity mean that the defendant may use
that work in any way it sees fit? David Nimmer has proposed a two-part
framework for handling cases at the intersection of copyright, the right of
publicity, and contract.
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Nimmer proposes that copyrights used for commercial advertising
purposes, and not for pure entertainment, should not preempt a
22
state right of publicity claim. Using Nimmer’s structure, the Third
Circuit held that a sports broadcaster’s right of publicity claim
trumped the National Football League’s (NFL) competing copyright
claim because the NFL used its copyrighted film for commercial
23
benefit.
Part I of this Comment describes the development of federal
copyright law and state right of publicity laws and further explains the
failed attempt of the federal preemption clause to provide a clear
standard for copyright preemption. It then discusses Nimmer’s
solution to this ambiguous area of the law. Part II examines the goals
of the Federal Copyright Act, federalism, and First Amendment law
to argue that Nimmer’s test both fails to fulfill these goals and is
difficult to apply to preemption disputes in our modern mediasaturated society. Finally, Part III proposes a more pragmatic
solution to resolve preemption issues by adopting a test for similarity
from trademark law. This Comment concludes that copyrightpreemption disputes can be resolved by considering the consumer’s
perspective on the reasonable expectations of celebrities and
copyright owners.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Development of Copyright Preemption
The conflict that arises between a right of publicity claim and a
copyright claim stems from a larger debate about the balance
24
between state and federal powers.
This section explains the
fundamental tension between the state and federal legislatures in the
specific area of copyright law. Examining the development of federal
copyright protection and state right of publicity laws helps explain

Id.
22. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(10)–
(11), (14)–(15) (explaining that there should not be any issue of conflict
preemption if the courts simply distinguish between utilizations that are commercial
or “for the purposes of trade,” and those uses that are entertainment, and therefore,
part of the exclusive rights of copyright owners).
23. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1030 (deciding that the 22-minute NFL film was
promotional in nature and “akin to advertising,” and therefore concluding that
preemption was inappropriate according to Nimmer’s framework).
24. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 204 (noting that “[t]he right of publicity
conflicts . . . with explicit provisions of the Copyright Act”).
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this preemption debate and reveals why the preemption dispute in
Facenda prompted the Third Circuit to rely on Nimmer’s framework.
1.

The creation of a federal copyright system
25
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) grants authors
copyright protection for their works in order to incentivize the
26
production of new creative works. The goal of the Copyright Act is
to promote public knowledge and awareness by increasing the
27
production of “original works of authorship” available for the
28
29
Such “original works of authorship”
public’s consideration.
include a wide range of media, such as movies, literature,
30
architecture, television shows, and sound recordings.
However, Congress recognized the need to provide some reward to
creators, authors, and producers in exchange for their investment in
order to encourage individuals to spend time and money producing
31
original works for public access.
Therefore, the Copyright Act

25. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976) (amending the first Federal Copyright Act
enacted in 1790).
26. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(opining that the goal of copyright law is not to merely reward authors for their
labor, but rather “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that the purpose of creating a federal
system of copyright and patent law was “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (explaining that, in order for a
work of authorship to qualify as original, it must be “independently created by the
author . . . [and] possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity”).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (setting forth eight categories of works that are
considered the subject matter of copyright: (1) literary works, (2) musical works,
(3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and choreography, (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings,
and (8) architectural works).
31. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 11 (explaining that “[a] principal reason for
affording copyright protection” is to encourage the creation of original works of
authorship); Rothman, supra note 15, at 204 (explaining that copyright “strive[s] to
protect creative artists and to provide incentives for them to create”). The
Association of Research Libraries notes that:
[T]he law was meant to provide an incentive to authors, artists, and scientists
to create original works by providing creators with a monopoly. At the same
time, the monopoly was limited in order to stimulate creativity and the
advancement of science and the useful arts through wide public access to
works in the public domain.
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32

grants copyright owners exclusive rights in their copyrighted works.
These exclusive rights allow the copyright holder to control the
33
current and future uses of the work. This control creates a system of
economic rewards for copyright owners because they can charge
34
others for access to, and use of, the work. Examples of economic
benefit include: licensing fees for radio stations, ticket sales to
35
theatrical productions, and purchases of film scripts.
Thus, the
Copyright Act maintains an economic framework that rewards the
36
copyright owner and the public.
Not only does the copyright owner have incentives to share the
original work with the public, but the Copyright Act also provides
37
incentives for the creation of derivative works, which are based upon
38
the original copyrighted work.
Derivative works may qualify for
39
their own copyright protection, and in such cases the copyright
Association of Research Libraries, Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the
United
States
(2007),
http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/copyresources/
copytimeline.shtml (internal quotations omitted).
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting exclusive rights to copyright owners for a
limited time, such as the right to display, perform, distribute, reproduce, and
prepare derivative works of the original copyrighted work).
33. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983)
(asserting that the copyright holder has the right to control and produce derivative
works). In that case, the owners of the copyright in the Wizard of Oz character,
Dorothy, could maintain an action for copyright infringement if the plaintiff did not
authorize the defendant’s production of plates painted with the image of Dorothy.
Id. at 303.
34. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 204 (explaining that one rationale for
copyright protection is that it combines artistic and economic values, including the
right to license the work, convey it to others, and gain remedies against others who
inappropriately use the work without consent of the copyright owner); see also Hardy,
supra note 19, ¶ 5 (asserting that copyright owners can only make a profit from their
work if they can be assured that only a minimal amount of copying of their works will
occur if they release them to the public domain).
35. Cf. Christian Copyright Licensing International, The Church Copyright
License Annual Fee-U.S., http://www.ccli.com/WhatWeOffer/LicenseFees.aspx
(last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (listing the various fees that are charged to churches for
access to the copyrighted sermons available for broadcast).
36. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1995) (“The copyright system seeks to promote the public
benefit of advancing knowledge and learning by means of an incentive system . . .
[and t]he economic rewards of the marketplace are offered to authors in order to
stimulate them to produce and disseminate new works.”).
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing the copyright owner with the exclusive
right “to prepare derivative works based upon the [original] copyrighted work”).
38. See id. (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted”).
39. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980)
(clarifying that the original aspects of a derivative work can receive copyright
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owner maintains exclusive rights over the derivative and the original
40
work. This exclusive control over the production of derivative works
serves as an additional economic incentive for copyright owners to
41
create new works.
42
To keep pace with technological advancements, courts have
43
broadened the scope of works that qualify for copyright protection.
44
45
46
For example, computer software, videogames, and movie clips are
eligible to receive copyright protection.
Copyright protection
extends to works that incorporate a high degree of technological
processes, and the exclusive rights granted to authors are far47
reaching. The applicability of copyright law to a very broad range of

protection, but only if the originality is “more than trivial,” and the derivative work
does not infringe on the scope of the exclusive copyrights in the original work).
40. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that a
derivative work may qualify for copyright protection; however, it must have sufficient
creativity and be based on a copyrightable work, and only the new creative aspects in
the derivative work may be copyrighted). In that case, the defendant’s paintings of
the Dorothy character from the Wizard of Oz were not sufficiently independently
creative to qualify for their own copyright protection. Id. at 305.
41. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 210 (arguing that, because derivative works are
a “major source of income” for copyright owners, the right to prepare derivative
works is a “vital element in encouraging the production of new work”).
42. The House Report on the general subject matter of copyright explained
that:
[T]he history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the
types of works accorded protection . . . [and] scientific discoveries and
technological developments have made possible new forms of creative
expression that never existed before. . . . Authors are continually finding new
ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that
these new expressive methods will take.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
43. See Association of Research Libraries, supra note 31 (stating that the
Copyright Act was revised in 1976 due to the changes in technology that affected how
works could be copied and “what constituted an infringement”).
44. See Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983) (considering a computer program a type of “literary work” that should
therefore receive protection under the Copyright Act of 1976).
45. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 435–36 (4th Cir. 1986)
(expressly disagreeing with the lower court by holding that a video game based upon
a copyrighted blackjack card game was within the subject matter of copyright—in the
form of an audiovisual work—because of the creative expression that goes into
creating the shape, sounds, format, and layout of the game).
46. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc. 342 F.3d 191, 194,
207 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Disney had an exclusive right to manage the clips
from portions of its movies, and thus could prevent Video Pipeline from streaming
segments of these movie clips online).
47. See generally Grant Gross, IP conference: Copyright Has Gone Too Far, THE
REGISTER, Nov. 16, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/16/ip_conference_
copyright_law_has/ (discussing how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
gives a handful of media companies “an enormous additional amount of control”
because it allows for copyright owners to impose digital rights management
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creative works means that copyright holders have a long chain of
48
economic reward and control.
Although this incentive system in copyright law is not unique to the
49
United States, it deviates from some European countries in how
50
much protection it affords to authors of a work. In some European
countries, the author is the only person that can originally own the
copyright in the work, and the author maintains a right to receive
51
royalties for any future uses of the tangible work. However, in the
United States, the copyright owner can be distinct from the author of
52
the work. In copyrighted works for hire or collaborative works, the
individual author does not necessarily own the copyright for the
53
entire work. Furthermore, the owner can sell the copyright in the
54
work separately from the tangible work.
As such, the copyright
holder may have the power to control the fate of a work that derives
55
from another author. This distinction between artist and copyright

techniques and provides that copyright infringers might also be sentenced to jail
time for hacking into protected internet web pages).
48. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1983)
(allowing the copyright holders of the Wizard of Oz to sue for infringement when
replicas of its characters were painted on a series of plates); see also Brett
Barrouquore, Seuss Lawyers Stop Holiday Who-ville in Louisville, SFGATE, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/11/25/national/
a063325S99.DTL (granting the copyright owners of Dr. Seuss’s “Who-ville”
characters an injunction against the city of Louisville to prevent the city from using
the Seuss characters in a Christmas parade).
49. See, e.g., Association of Research Libraries, supra note 31 (mentioning that the
federal system of copyright law in the United States is modeled after Great Britain’s
copyright system).
50. See generally Open Access to Scholarly Information: Copyright, http://openaccess.net/de_en/general_information/legal_issues/copyright/ (last visited Dec. 1,
2009) (explaining the differences between the American legal framework and that
employed by Germany).
51. See id. (detailing that, in Germany, copyright ownership vests with the author
and seeks to protect “the economic and moral interests of the author”); see also
2 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 4, § 8C.04[A][1] (explaining that the copyright
laws of France and other European countries recognize a right called droit de suite,
which “is the right of an artist to 'follow' or participate in the proceeds realized from
the resale of the tangible embodiment of her work”).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (clarifying that “[o]wnership of a copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any
material object in which the work is embodied”).
53. See, e.g., Recording Artist’s Project at Harvard Law School, Copyright Basics,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rap/copyright (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (warning
artists that in a work for hire, the creator “owns nothing”).
54. See 17 U.S.C § 202 (explaining that transfer of ownership of the material work
does not mean a transfer of ownership of the copyright—they are separate and
distinct).
55. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (9th Cir.
2006) (deciding that Sony owned the copyright to the song in which the artist sang,
and thus Sony could use segments of the song in future sound recordings).
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owner is important to keep in mind when discussing the right to
control the distribution of copyrighted works.
2.

The rise of state right of publicity laws
56
Despite this broad federal copyright system, copyright owners do
57
not maintain a monopoly over the use of their works. Various legal
58
claims, such as the fair use doctrine in copyright and the application
59
of state laws, limit the ability of copyright owners to have absolute
60
control over the use of their creative expressions. In particular, the
court-developed right of publicity doctrine limits, and arguably
conflicts with, copyright owners’ ability to fully exercise their
61
exclusive rights.
62
A right of publicity, now codified in many states, allows an
individual to protect against the unauthorized commercial use of his

56. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5664 (recognizing that the coverage of subject matter of copyright in the current
federal copyright statute is very broad and may be further broadened).
57. See Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 5 (“Protection does not have to be, and will never
be, absolute. That is, once a work of authorship is released to the public, as a
practical matter some uncontrolled copying is possible and even likely.”).
58. The fair use doctrine states that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
59. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 210 F. Supp.
2d 552, 568–69 (D. N.J. 2002) (holding the exclusive rights to creative expression
afforded by federal copyright law did not preempt the defendant’s state law
conversion and replevin claims seeking the return of tangible property).
60. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 46–88 (discussing how state law breach of contract
claims, unjust enrichment claims, and right of publicity claims are not necessarily
preempted by a competing federal copyright claim).
61. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953) (creating the term “right of publicity” in the opinion written by Judge
Jerome Frank); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal
Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1126–28 (1953) (explaining that the right of publicity,
developed in the Haelan case, offers celebrities an additional remedy beyond breach
of contract and tort in order to protect the commercial benefit of their personas).
62. See Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute: Publicity,
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/Publicity (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (noting that
only around half the states have right of publicity statutes); see also Landham v. Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. 227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[t]he right of
publicity is a creature of state common law and statute and originated as part of the
common-law right of privacy”).
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63

or her identity. This right of publicity derives from an individual’s
64
right of privacy in tort law. However, as Judge Jerome Frank opined
65
in 1953, the right of publicity is separate and distinct from the right
of privacy because the publicity right concerns the public exposure of
66
an individual’s identity for commercial benefit. Today, this state
right is similar to an intellectual property right because it details a
67
right of control over an identity.
This state right is primarily
claimed by celebrities to prevent the unauthorized use of their
68
images for advertising purposes. This Comment will refer to the
right of publicity claimant as the “celebrity” because the individual
must be an actor, singer, or other type of well-known entertainment
69
figure.
The goal of the right of publicity is to prevent another person from
70
benefitting from the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s identity.
An infringement of this right is distinct from a false advertising claim
arising under trademark law because it does not require that the

63. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007) (allowing any person
whose “name or likeness has commercial value” to bring an action to prevent the
unauthorized commercial use of such name or likeness).
64. See, e.g., James Chadwick & Roxana Vatanparast, The Copyright Act’s Preemption
of Right of Publicity Claims, 25 COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (2008) (mentioning that the law was
“historically treated as a species of the tort of invasion of privacy”).
65. See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (announcing for the first time a right of publicity
that is separate from a right of privacy).
66. See Grodin, supra note 61, at 1127 (“[Haelan] gave protection to persons’
commercial interest in their personality [sic] independent of their privacy interest.
[I]n so doing, Haelan implied that such commercial interest, aside from any privacy
interest, might justify legal protection of an individual against unauthorized use of
his name or picture.”).
67. See Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 3 (“[Right of publicity] claims
are now generally recognized as involving a form of intellectual property, particularly
in connection with celebrities who assert not a ‘right to be left alone,’ but rather the
right to control and profit from the use of their names and images.”).
68. See Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn’t Be: The Right of Publicity
Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 597 (1992) (“The most common invocation of [the
right of publicity] occurs when a third party appropriates a celebrity’s name or
likeness for endorsement purposes, for the sale of memorabilia, or in connection
with artistic or literary works.”).
69. See Grodin, supra note 61, at 1127 (noting that this right was developed
particularly for famous persons due to the need to protect the monetary interest in
their personalities).
70. The Supreme Court noted in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.:
The rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straightforward one
of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will . . . [and] no social
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.
433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren
and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
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celebrity be falsely associated with a commercial product. Instead,
the right of publicity is concerned with any use of a celebrity’s
identity, and it seeks to prevent others from unjustly benefitting from
72
the use of that identity. In 1977, the Supreme Court recognized this
73
right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. by
allowing a “human cannonball” performer to recover damages from a
broadcasting company after the company videotaped the performer’s
74
entire act without authorization.
In addition to protecting the
celebrities’ identities from unauthorized use, the Court also noted
other justifications for this state right, including the need to
encourage celebrities to invest time and money to make their
75
performances interesting to the public.
Courts’ willingness to uphold a right of publicity claim is on the
76
rise.
These claims do not necessarily require that any tangible
77
aspect of the celebrity’s identity was misused; simply conjuring up
the celebrity’s identity may be enough to infringe a celebrity’s right
78
of publicity. The Ninth Circuit went so far as to uphold Vanna

71. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that, unlike a claim for false advertising under trademark law, a right of publicity
claim does not require evidence that a consumer is likely to be confused); see also 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:19, at 437 (2d ed.
2009) (pointing out that a false endorsement claim requires a false inference that
the plaintiff approves of the product).
72. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573–75 (explaining that a celebrity should have the
right to benefit from his creative work, and another should not be able to share the
performance with the public while denying the celebrity’s right to commercial
benefit).
73. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
74. See id. at 563–64 (noting that the length of the entire clip was fifteen
seconds).
75. See id. at 576 (highlighting that “the protection provides an economic
incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of
interest to the public”).
76. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 204–05 (mentioning that conflicts between
copyright and right of publicity claims are on the rise because “right of publicity
actions have proliferated and the right has expanded to cover ‘persona’”).
77. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(clarifying that a right of publicity claim does not require actual use of the
individual’s name, image, or likeness, but instead whether the facts taken together as
a whole are sufficient to suggest the capture of the individual’s identity).
78. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing
and remanding a grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact existed
as to whether the defendant’s creation of animatronic characters of Wendt, based
upon his character in the television show Cheers, violated his right of publicity);
see also White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (ruling that a robot character wearing a long gown,
blonde wig, and large jewelry and turning a wheel similar to that in Wheel of Fortune in
a commercial advertisement sufficiently conjured up White’s persona to raise issues
of fact on whether her right of publicity was infringed, thereby making summary
judgment inappropriate).
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White’s right of publicity claim against Samsung Electronics when
Samsung’s commercial included a robotic character that spun a
79
wheel and wore a blonde wig. With the strengthening of this right,
celebrities now have some say in the fate of the works in which their
personalities are captured, even if a copyright in the work is owned by
another. Thus, the copyright owner’s traditional power to control
the original use, future use, and licenses of a copyrighted work is now
80
sliding into the grip of the individual celebrity. Where the celebrity
and the copyright owner have different agendas and expectations for
the copyrighted work, courts look to the purposes and interests
81
served by the federal and state laws to decide which claim to uphold.
3.

Preemption debate in copyright law
Although the state right of publicity serves a valid purpose in
protecting a celebrity from commercial exploitation, the execution of
the right often conflicts with a copyright owner’s attempt to exercise
82
the exclusive rights afforded by the Copyright Act. This conflict
usually arises when a copyright owner holds a valid copyright in a
work that captures the celebrity’s identity, and the owner uses the
83
copyrighted work in a way that the celebrity does not approve. This
process includes the distribution of the copyright, the performance
79. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397–99 (rejecting White’s right of publicity claim
based upon a California statute, but allowing a common law right of publicity claim
to proceed).
80. Cf. Goldman, supra note 68, at 600–01 (noting that prior to widespread court
recognition of a right of publicity in Zacchini, the only claim available for celebrities
was a right of privacy under tort law, which did not always apply in disputes related to
copyrighted works).
81. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1398–99 (noting that the right of publicity was
created to provide celebrities with an interest in the commercial use of their
identities, and applying this interest to demonstrate that Vanna White deserved the
right to enjoin Samsung from using her persona in a commercial advertisement for
the company’s products); see also Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)
(opining that the unauthorized use in a song of a voice that sounded just like Bette
Midler’s was an attempt to circumvent the proper value that “the market would have
paid for Midler to have sung the commercial in person”).
82. One commentator argued that:
Both copyright and the right of publicity strive to protect creative artists and
to provide incentives for them to create; however, the two rights . . . can
come into serious conflict. . . . [because t]he right of publicity conflicts not
only with the explicit provisions of the Copyright Act, but also with the
implicit grant of affirmative rights to copyright holders and the public, as
well as the purposes behind the copyright protection.
Rothman, supra note 15, at 204.
83. See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663,
677 (7th Cir. 1986) (deciding that a baseball player could not rely on a right of
publicity to defeat the Major League Baseball’s (MLB) exclusive right to broadcast
the baseball games for which they owned a copyright).
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84

of the copyrighted work, and the preparation of derivative works
85
that use segments of the original work.
The conflict often arises when the celebrity contracts to the use of
his or her identity in the original work, but does not agree to have the
86
identity captured in derivative works.
The conflict is especially
problematic because the Copyright Act expressly grants the right to
87
prepare derivative works to the copyright holder.
Thus, the
Copyright Act forces various courts to decide which claim should
triumph: the celebrity’s state right of publicity or the copyright
88
owner’s federal rights.
Any conflict between a state law and a federal law inherently
89
invokes the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. In an effort to
uphold the Supremacy Clause, the Copyright Act includes a
90
preemption clause in section 301. Section 301 explains that the
84. See id. (deciding that the players’ right of publicity in their performances was
equivalent to the MLB’s exclusive right to perform the work when the MLB
broadcasts the players’ baseball performances).
85. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding
that Tom Waits, a professional singer, songwriter, and actor, could prevent Frito-Lay
from imitating and then broadcasting a commercial for Frito-Lay based on FritoLay’s authorized license in the original sound recording of Waits’s voice).
86. See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2005)
(summarizing that Toney was a model who contractually agreed to authorize the use
of her image and likeness to the Johnson hair company between 1995–1998, but
sued under a right of publicity claim when Johnson attempted to use Toney’s image
to promote L’Oreal products that were not explicitly agreed to and fell beyond the
contractual time period).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) (“[T]he owner of [a] copyright . . . has the
exclusive right to do and to authorize . . . [the] prepar[ation of] derivative works
based on the copyrighted work.”).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (noting that any legal or equitable rights that are
the equivalent to those offered in the Copyright Act shall be preempted, but failing
to clarify exactly which state rights should be considered an equivalent, as opposed to
a superior, right).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 24 (1824) (holding that,
when Congress legislates within its powers, conflicting state laws must give way to the
federal law).
90. The statute provides that:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B], at 1-7
(arguing that “courts grappling with the tension between federal and state law may
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federal Copyright Act will preempt any state laws that offer rights
91
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights in the Copyright Act. The
goal of section 301 is to foreclose any misinterpretation between state
92
and federal law.
However, the preemption clause does not resolve all conflicts
between a state right of publicity claim and a federal copyright
93
claim. Because state right of publicity claims do not afford rights
94
that are precisely equivalent to those in the Copyright Act, they are
95
Therefore, a
not expressly preempted by the Copyright Act.
problem arises in determining when a court should still preempt
these state-law claims because they conflict with the overall goals of
96
97
the Copyright Act. Under the theory of conflict preemption, a
court may invalidate a state law that is “an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
98
Congress.”
Thus, when faced with a potential conflict between
federal and state law, courts look to whether a statute expressly
99
preempts state law and whether conflict preemption is present.
apply various tests to determine whether the Supremacy Clause requires pre-emption
of state law”).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
92. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 1–2 (quoting the legislative history of section 301
for the proposition that the preemption provision was “set forth in the clearest and
most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation . . . and to avoid the development of any vague borderline between
State and Federal protection.” (internal quotations omitted)).
93. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][1][c], at 1-30 to 1-31
(clarifying that because the subject of a right of publicity claim is the claimant’s
persona, which does not fall within the scope of the Copyright Act, the Act’s
preemption clause does not resolve a conflict between state and federal law because
it does not apply).
94. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007) (allowing an individual to
prevent the unauthorized “commercial” use of a name or likeness, which is not the
equivalent of any of the exclusive rights offered in the Copyright Act).
95. See, e.g., Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1027 (3d Cir. 2008) (opining
that the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute was not expressly preempted because
Facenda’s voice itself was not within the subject matter of copyright and the statute
did not offer a right equivalent to those listed in the Copyright Act); see also 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 4, §1.01[B][3][a], at 1-77 (explaining that the Supreme Court
has clarified that the existence of an express preemption clause does not mean that
preemption is limited to express preemption cases; it may also arise under general
conflict preemption, in which the state statute conflicts with the general goals of the
federal law).
96. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the history and goals of the Copyright Act).
97. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1028 (noting that this conflict preemption may be
referred to as “implied preemption”).
98. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
99. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) (opining that the
existence of an express preemption clause in a federal statute “does not mean that
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption”). The
Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished between express preemption and
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Unfortunately, the language of the preemption clause combined
with legislative history creates a challenge for courts faced with
100
conflict preemption in copyright. In the original version of section
301, Congress explicitly listed the state laws that the Copyright Act
101
would not preempt;
however, for unclear reasons, Congress
102
decided to eliminate the clear list in the final version of the statute.
Some courts have reasoned that the deletion of this specific list
means that Congress believed that the Copyright Act should never
preempt certain state rights, including the right of publicity, while
other courts have looked to other areas of the law to interpret section
103
301.
Lacking examples of the types of state laws that section 301
seeks to preempt, courts have applied the preemption clause with
104
uncertainty and inconsistency.
Ultimately, the inclusion of a preemption clause in the Copyright
Act far from resolves the conflict between right of publicity claims
105
and copyright claims. The Fifth Circuit upheld an individual’s right
of publicity claim when a copyrighted photograph of the individual
106
appeared on a shampoo bottle, yet it preempted baseball players’
implied preemption, understanding that cases in which a state law presents an actual
conflict with federal law as an instance of “implied preemption.” Id. at 288–89.
100. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 232–35 (describing how the language of the
preemption clause and the legislative history in its enactment have confused courts
when attempting to resolve preemption issues).
101. The original draft of section 301 explicitly stated that the Copyright Law
would not preempt
any state [law] with respect to . . . activities violating legal or equitable rights
that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by Section 106, including rights against
misappropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights, breaches of
contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy,
defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false
representation.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 24 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746.
102. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 234–35 (arguing that “the deletion of
language from the final version of the statute further confuses courts as to Congress’
intent” and that “[t]here is a debate over why this language was deleted”).
103. See id. at 235 (noting that some courts and scholars have found the legislative
history of section 301 to be inconclusive, while others have argued that Congress
deleted the language to “prove that the right of publicity can never be preempted”).
104. See generally Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 24 (arguing that the preemption clause
has undergone an “inconsistent” interpretation at best).
105. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that, even though there have been
hundreds of cases relating to copyright preemption at the circuit court level, many of
which have conflicting outcomes, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case to clarify
this area of the law).
106. See Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2005) (allowing
Toney to proceed on a claim of right of publicity when the defendant used her
photo for an advertisement without her consent even though the defendant was
lawfully entitled to use the photograph for other purposes).
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right of publicity claim related to the copyrighted broadcast of their
107
games. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit preempted a celebrity’s right
108
of publicity claim in a photograph appearing in L.A. Weekly, but
allowed a celebrity’s right of publicity to trump the copyright claim
109
relating to the creation of animatronic characters of his image.
Even though the creation of the Copyright Act and its preemption
provision sought to eliminate confusion and inconsistency in the
110
law, many would agree that “it would not be an overstatement to
describe this important provision in the Copyright Act as a ‘legislative
111
failure.’”
B. Preemption Issue in Facenda v. NFL Films
Given the uncertainty in this area of copyright law, the Third
Circuit turned to Nimmer for guidance on the conflict preemption
112
issue in Facenda v. NFL Films.
The preemption claim raised in
Facenda involved the NFL’s valid copyright interest in the sound
113
recording of the voice of sports broadcaster John Facenda.
Facenda was a Philadelphia sports broadcaster who worked with
114
the NFL for many years to produce football documentaries.
Specifically, Facenda worked on a session-by-session basis with the
NFL to produce NFL films, which the NFL then advertised as
107. Balt. Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 667
(7th Cir. 1986) (finding that the baseball players’ right of publicity in their
performance was equivalent to the MLB’s right to audiovisual broadcast, rendering
the players’ claim of a right to publicity preempted under the Copyright Act).
108. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that Dustin Hoffman’s right of publicity claim was preempted by the
First Amendment when his image was used for editorial expression and not for pure
commercial purposes).
109. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that Wendt’s right of publicity claim was not preempted as a matter of law when
defendant used animatronic characters to portray his likeness).
110. See Sears, Roebuck & Co v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964) (noting
that Congress’s intent to create uniformity can be seen in statutes where it vests
exclusive federal jurisdiction to hear copyright cases and by the “section of the
Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings but does
not include published writings”); see also Bauer, supra note 13, at 1 (claiming that, by
federalizing copyright law, the Framers of the Constitution sought to “achieve
uniformity and avoid the potential for state protection of infinite duration”).
111. Bauer, supra note 13, at 2; see also Moore, supra note 9, at 201 (explaining that
“case law is in chaos on these issues [of preemption] and there is, to date, no logical,
rational analysis to determine the answers”).
112. 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008) (turning directly to Nimmer’s framework
when discussing the conflict preemption issue between Facenda and the NFL).
113. See id. at 1026 (recounting that the copyright in the sound clips of Facenda’s
voice derived from a copyrighted production of NFL films in which Facenda
expressly contracted to appear).
114. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1012.
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documentaries with the “[l]egendary [v]oice of John Facenda.”
116
Football fans termed Facenda “the Voice of God,” and Facenda
117
worked with the NFL to produce films for decades. While most of
118
his contracts with the NFL were oral, shortly before he died from
cancer in 1984, Facenda signed an express contract allowing the NFL
to enjoy the use of his film sequences “provided, however, such use
119
does not constitute an endorsement of any product or service.”
In 2005, the NFL produced a short film entitled the “The Making
of Madden NFL 06” (“Making of Madden”), which focused on the
120
then-upcoming video game “Madden NFL 2006.”
In addition to
interviews with players and the video game’s producers, the film
121
While Facenda did not
included sound clips of Facenda’s voice.
personally work on this short film, the NFL included his voice in the
film by using segments of the old NFL copyrighted films that featured
122
Facenda’s commentary. In 2007, Facenda’s estate sued the league
under a false endorsement claim and for unauthorized use of his
123
name or likeness under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute.
The NFL denied that this film was a commercial endorsement in
depositions, but the Third Circuit determined that the short film was
an infomercial designed to promote sales of the “Madden NFL 06”
124
video game.
C. Nimmer’s Preemption Test
125

Forgoing a discussion of case law, the Third Circuit’s discussion
of the conflict preemption dispute in Facenda relied exclusively on

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. (explaining that Facenda was paid per each program he produced).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. (explaining that the 22-minute film appeared on the NFL network
eight times during the three days leading up to the video game’s release).
121. Id.
122. See id. (highlighting that the documentary included three sentences read by
Facenda which took approximately thirteen seconds of the program).
123. Id. at 1011; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007) (allowing a
claim if one’s name or likeness is used for commercial purposes without consent).
124. See Facenda, 524 F.3d at 1012 (noting that, even though the NFL executives
denied the commercial purpose of the film in their depositions, the record indicated
various email messages that suggested that “NFL Films sought to create the program
as promotion for Madden NFL 06, describing it as the ‘Madden Promo’ or as
‘the Advertisements’ in the actors’ release forms”).
125. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029–32 (beginning its discussion of the state right of
publicity claim by explaining Nimmer’s framework, rather than turning to case law).
The court continued to discuss the framework and why Nimmer believes various
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126

Nimmer’s framework.
Nimmer developed this test as a means of
reconciling the various court decisions dealing with copyright
127
preemption of a right of publicity claim. Nimmer determined that
there is a pattern that involves distinguishing between a commercial
128
advertisement and an entertainment work.
Based upon this
pattern, Nimmer puts forth a framework that involves a two-step
process to determine whether the right of publicity claim should
129
overcome the competing copyright claim.
Under his test, courts should first determine whether the
130
copyrighted work in dispute was used for an entertainment purpose
131
Nimmer directs courts to
or a commercial advertising purpose.
refrain from classifying works by their nature or medium because,
under his test, there is no single type of work (e.g., movie, book,
song) that will always be commercial or will always be
132
entertainment. Rather, courts should look specifically to the use of
circuit courts allowed a right of publicity claim to stand in some cases and why the
claim failed in other cases. Id.
126. See id. at 1030–32 (concluding that this was not an express preemption of the
right of publicity because the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute did not have the
same elements as a copyright claim; rather, it had an extra element requiring
“commercial” use of the name or likeness).
127. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11)
(focusing on sixteen different “right of publicity” cases to explain his framework).
128. See id. (listing cases in which a right of publicity was upheld along with those
where it was preempted, and then determining that the former were all
“commercial” uses of a copyright, while the later were “expressive” uses of the
copyrighted work).
129. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(15) (explaining that if a work is an
expressive use, then it should not be preempted; however, if it is a commercial use,
then it is necessary to look to the artist’s contract to see if the artist agreed to such a
use). Nimmer applies this framework to Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996), to explain that because Fleet contracted to act in a commercial
film, he could not later complain when the film was broadcast on television.
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(18).
130. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11)
(failing to provide a clear definition of the term “expressive” as he uses it, and
instead merely listing several examples of works that he considers expressive,
including a movie, a docudrama, a character in a movie, a song, and a digitized
image).
131. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(10)–(11) (placing a commercial
advertisement into the general category of a work made “for the purposes of trade”)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995)). Nimmer also
quotes the Restatement:
The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are used ‘for the
purposes of trade’ . . . if they are used in advertising the user’s goods or
services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in
connection with services rendered by the user.
Id. at 1-88.2(10) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995)).
132. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) (demonstrating how a type of
work, such as a film, can be “protected” as entertainment if it teaches how to dance,
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the copyrighted work to determine whether the copyright owner used
the work as a commercial advertisement for another product, or
133
whether it was an expressive use for public entertainment.
134
Expressive uses of a copyright are likely to preempt a state right.
However, if a court determines that use of the copyright is for a
commercial advertisement, it should then look to Nimmer’s second
135
prong.
Nimmer’s second prong asks courts to look at the terms of the
original contract to determine if the celebrity agreed to participate in
136
commercial advertisements.
Nimmer explains that if the original
work was a commercial advertisement for a product or concept courts
have been likely to find that the celebrity implicitly authorized the
copyright owner to create derivative works for commercial advertising
137
purposes. On the other hand, if the original work was completely
unrelated to the promotion of a product or idea, courts have been
138
much more willing to uphold the celebrity’s right of publicity claim.
For example, when a celebrity sings a song for an album, she cannot
prevent the copyright owner from creating another album song that
139
uses the copyrighted portion of her voice.
However, where a

“but [it is] on the wrong side if it just glorifies a computer game that the NFL wants
to sell”).
133. See id. (“The distinction between those lists is not between categories, but
between utilizations. A song can be on the right side if used to express Jennifer
Lopez’s artistic vision, but on the wrong if it hawks [sic] Cheetos and Cherokees.”).
134. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) (noting that cases he deemed to
be expressive uses turned out to be the ones in which the various courts preempted
the right of publicity claim).
135. See, e.g., Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc. 542 F.3d 1007, 1030 (3d Cir. 2008)
(explaining that Nimmer directs the courts to look at the “purpose[s] of the use to
which the plaintiff [celebrity] initially consented when signing over the copyright in
a contract”).
136. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(16)
(citing Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), as an example in
which the artists agreed to participate in the commercial production of a movie in
contract, and thus failed to get an injunction to prevent the movie company from
distributing a movie based on a right of publicity claim).
137. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(18) (asserting that an artist who
“sang for a recording . . . could not complain when that very recording was later
exploited, by being used as background [for a] Jennifer Lopez [song]”).
138. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) (listing nine cases where the court
upheld a right of publicity claim because the original copyrighted works had no
relation to their derivative works, which were commercial advertisements for
unrelated products, including the use of singer Tom Waits’s voice in a Doritos
commercial and the use of Vanna White’s likeness to sell Samsung televisions).
139. See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir.
2003) (declaring that a singer’s claim regarding the sampling of a previously
recorded song being used in a new song by a different artist was preempted by
federal law).
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celebrity appears in a copyrighted artistic photograph, she may be
able to prevent the copyright owner from placing that photo on a
140
shampoo bottle.
Through this framework, Nimmer explains the conflicting
141
outcomes in sixteen different right of publicity claims.
Of these
sixteen cases, nine courts allowed the state claim to stand, and seven
142
courts upheld the copyright owner’s claim. Nimmer proposes that
when a celebrity agrees to participate in a copyrighted work knowing
that it will be used for commercial advertisements, they should not
later be able to deny the copyright owner the ability to exercise all of
the exclusive federal rights, including the preparation of derivative
143
On the other hand, he
works that use the celebrity’s identity.
instructs that a federal copyright claim should fail to preempt a state
right of publicity claim when the copyrighted work is created for a
commercial purpose that the celebrity has not explicitly agreed to in
144
his or her contract. Nimmer includes the district court’s holding in
145
Facenda as an example of the latter situation.
While Nimmer successfully rationalizes the outcomes of various
copyright-preemption disputes through his framework, it is important
to consider whether his framework will assist courts in future
preemption claims. Therefore, this Comment will analyze (1) the
140. See Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying
that a model’s right of publicity claim was preempted by federal law when her
photograph was used without her consent on the packaging for a hair care product).
141. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11)
(listing the various cases that he uses to advance his theory).
142. See id.
143. The court in Facenda discusses Nimmer’s analysis of Fleet by explaining:
Fleet acted in a movie; for that reason, he could not complain when that very
movie was later exploited, by being broadcast on television. Laws sang for a
recording; for that reason, she could not complain when that very recording
was later exploited, by being used as background for Jennifer Lopez.
Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1031 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(18)).
144. See id. at 1030 (explaining that, under Nimmer’s test, “[i]f . . . the plaintiff
did not collaborate specifically in the creation of advertising content, then the
plaintiff is in a strong position to assert continuing control over the use of his
image”); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II],
at 1-88.2(18) (contrasting the failed right of publicity claim in Toney with Facenda by
arguing that in Toney, the copyright owners did not misappropriate the use of the
work; rather, “they simply did exactly what she agreed to,” which “stand[s] poles
apart from the NFL” when it used Facenda’s commentary for a video game).
145. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(17)
(“[I]n [the Facenda] case, ‘a Philadelphia television news anchorman, and the
narrator of NFL Films’ game footage and highlight reels,’ was allowed to maintain a
publicity claim when the NFL repurposed recordings of his voice not for a new
entertainment product, but instead for an elaborate infomercial.” (citing Facenda v.
NFL. Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2007))).
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goals of copyright law, (2) potential preemption disputes, and (3) the
application of Nimmer’s test in Facenda, to determine if Nimmer
offers a viable solution to the copyright-preemption controversy.
The following argument will detail this analysis and explain how
Nimmer’s test ultimately fails to provide any more clarity in
copyright-preemption disputes.
II. NIMMER’S PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK DOES NOT PROPERLY
PROMOTE THE GOALS OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATURES
An examination of a proposed preemption framework should
scrutinize whether courts will be able to uphold the Constitution and
promote the goals of the legislature when applying the test to
146
individual cases. The test should also be easily applicable and lead
147
Because Nimmer’s test is not easily
to consistent case precedent.
applicable and does not promote constitutional objectives, courts
should not adopt it as an acceptable solution to the copyrightpreemption debate.
A. Three Considerations in Evaluating Nimmer’s Test
As previously noted by legal scholars, a copyright-preemption
framework should facilitate consistent application, protect creative
expression, and balance the interests of state and federal
148
legislatures.
First, the framework should promote a uniform and consistent
method to determine the extent of a copyright owner’s exclusive

146. See generally Bauer, supra note 13, at 6–11 (beginning his analysis of the
preemption doctrine in the Copyright Act by first outlining the goals of the federal
Copyright Act and the constitutional provisions related to copyright protection);
Kreiss, supra note 36, at 6, 9–10 (analyzing the importance of accessibility in
copyright law by first clarifying the goals of copyright law and then testing whether
provisions related to copyright accessibility help to achieve the goals of the Copyright
Act).
147. See generally Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 24 (explaining that one of the
fundamental complaints about the preemption provision in the Copyright Act is that
it is “inconsistent” and leads courts to develop different interpretations for when a
state law should be preempted).
148. See generally Bauer, supra note 13, at 3, 13 (discussing the role that
preemption should play in upholding the goals of the Copyright Act and explaining
the importance of upholding a uniform federal copyright system under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution); Goldman, supra note 68, at 616–17 (arguing
for the protection of the freedom of expression, as guaranteed by the First
Amendment); Rothman, supra note 15, at 240–50 (describing the importance of the
state interest and the federal interest served by right of publicity and copyright law
respectively, and critiquing preemption tests that do not properly balance these
competing interests).
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149

rights. The authors of the Copyright Act sought to create a uniform
federal framework that would provide equal protection to copyright
150
The Supreme Court explained that the
owners across all states.
exclusive right of federal courts to hear copyright cases reveals the
151
congressional goal of a uniform system. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit
again reiterated this goal in Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip
152
Technology Inc., noting that the “Congressional intent to have
153
Standardizing the
national uniformity in copyright laws is clear.”
rights and benefits of copyright ownership is necessary to incentivize
154
the creation of original expression, which is the fundamental
155
purpose of copyright protection.
A second consideration in evaluating a preemption framework is
whether the test properly protects the freedom of expression,

149. See Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in a Digital World: Providing Federal
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 59 (2009)
(asserting that the purpose of a unified federal system over a state system is to get rid
of the “anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, highly complicated dual system” of
common law copyright under state laws and federal law (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 109 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745)).
150. Congress detailed the reasoning for creating a uniform system for federal
statutory copyright:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the
Constitution, as shown in Madison’s comments in The Federalist, was to
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of
determining and enforcing an author’s rights under the differing laws and in
the separate courts of the various States.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976); see also Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts,
Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 49
(2007) (arguing that there is a federal goal of balance and uniformity when creating
policies and laws related to the federal Copyright Act).
151. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964)
(“The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in patent and copyright laws
can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to hear
patent and copyright cases in federal courts . . . .”).
152. 307 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. Id. at 781.
154. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (describing the purpose
of copyright as “to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic
creation” by “guarantee[ing] to authors and inventors a reward in the form of
control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works”); see also Dotan
Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation
on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1777–79 (2006) (arguing
that the Framers’ intent in the copyright clause was based on a theory of
encouragement, incentives, and progress).
155. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (mandating protection for copyrights to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
129 (1976) (declaring that, because “the methods for dissemination of an author’s
work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, national
uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry
out the constitutional intent”).
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regardless of whether that expression has a commercial purpose.
157
158
Commercial speech is protected speech by the First Amendment.
While commercial speech does not necessarily receive the same level
159
of protection as political speech, courts still offer it constitutional
160
protection. The Supreme Court has recognized that distinguishing
commercial speech from artistic speech can be an impossible task,
and when in doubt, courts should err on the side of protecting the
161
right to speak.
Even Nimmer suggests that it is not always easy to
draw a bright-line between commercial and non-commercial
162
speech. This difficulty reveals that any preemption proposal should
not call for a one-size-fits-all categorization of commercial and non163
commercial expression.
Third, a preemption solution should balance the interests served
164
by federal copyright law and state right of publicity laws.
Some

156. In discussing whether Congress may legislate copyright protection for facts,
Nimmer states:
The First Amendment, as applied to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, guarantees freedom of speech and press . . . [which] surely
limits, in some degree, the extent to which the states, as well as the federal
government, may confer a property status upon facts, or otherwise preclude
their free dissemination.
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][2][b], at 1-71.
157. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)
(explaining that in First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court employs a
three prong test to determine if a speech is commercial: (1) is the speech an
advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product or service; and
(3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the speech).
158. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that commercial speech “is entitled to a measure of First Amendment
protection”).
159. See id. at 1184–85 (stating that pure commercial speech is not granted the full
extent of First Amendment protection, and further explaining that false or
misleading commercial speech is not protected at all and may be regulated).
160. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183
(1999) (articulating that commercial speech may come within the provision of the
First Amendment, but only if the speech is lawful, not misleading, and outweighs the
government’s interest in regulating the speech).
161. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(stating, in dicta, “we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character
when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech”).
162. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12)
(admitting that “the line between intrinsic expression and commercial invocation
can itself be difficult to draw at times”).
163. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 617 (explaining that if courts attempt to draw
a clear line between commercial and non-commercial speech, they threaten to
“chill expressive conduct unquestionably protected by the First Amendment”).
164. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 117–18 (explaining that under conflict
preemption, a court “may also be required to balance the full range of interests and
values of the federal and state governments in the copyright area.”); see also Chadwick
& Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 3 (beginning their argument about preemption
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proposed solutions to the preemption issue call for eliminating the
165
right of publicity all together. However, a failure to recognize the
distinct and necessary protection afforded by this state right would
166
result in unfair exploitation of celebrities.
Therefore, preemption
frameworks that call for federal preemption in all cases are overly
167
Similarly, an excessive
simplistic and inappropriate solutions.
limitation of federal copyright protection would hinder the creation
168
of new works.
While Nimmer’s test does not call for a sweeping
elimination of either the state or federal right, it is still necessary to
examine whether he properly balances the interests and goals of the
conflicting laws.
B. Nimmer’s Test Fails to Fulfill Constitutional Objectives Related to
Creative Expression
Nimmer’s framework does not adequately solve the copyrightpreemption debate because it fails to promote the goals and legal
precedent established by copyright law, First Amendment law, and
state publicity laws. Moreover, the test is difficult to apply to modern
copyrighted works, and thus will not help courts establish a clear
169
standard in this area of the law.
1.

The test conflicts with the goals of copyright law set forth in the Copyright
Act and the Constitution
First, Nimmer’s proposed copyright-preemption test fails to fulfill a
primary goal of the Copyright Act because it does not promote a
proposals by noting the interaction between “interests protected by the right of
publicity” and “interests protected by the Copyright Act”).
165. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 628 (arguing that Congress should consider
federal legislation that would preempt a right of publicity in all copyright cases, and
that states which do not have right of publicity laws should refrain from creating
them).
166. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 245 (arguing that eliminating the right of
publicity would be a poor solution to this issue because this state right fills a void that
is not covered by contract law, copyright law, the law relating to unfair competition,
the law relating to false advertising, or any other area of the law).
167. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977)
(explaining that the right of publicity ensures that celebrities are not unfairly
exploited); see also Rothman, supra note 15, at 245 (explaining that the right of
publicity serves an important policy goal of preventing unjust enrichment, and it
would be inappropriate to do away with these state laws in all situations).
168. See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining that the ability to reap monetary benefit from
the production of derivative works is a major incentive for copyright owners to use
their copyrights to produce new works for public enjoyment).
169. See Schejter, supra note 7, at 6 (asserting that in modern media society, which
relies on product placement to advertise, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw
the line between an expressive work and a commercial advertisement).
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uniform copyright system. In drafting the Copyright Act of 1976, the
authors explicitly sought to avoid the inconsistent application of
170
Yet, under Nimmer’s
copyright protection across the states.
framework, once a court determines that the work is an
advertisement, it merely looks to the celebrity’s original contract to
see if the celebrity explicitly agreed to a commercial use of his or her
171
identity.
However, Nimmer admits that it is not always clear
172
Therefore, the
whether a work is expressive or commercial.
Copyright Act might govern in some jurisdictions, whereas the
173
unique terms of a contract may be decisive in other jurisdictions.
174
While contracts can play an important role in copyright law, the
problem in Nimmer’s test lies with the inconsistency in determining
whether a contract or the Copyright Act should govern a preemption
dispute. By allowing for a potentially subjective interpretation of
copyrighted use, Nimmer’s test offers copyright owners a different
measure of exclusive rights depending on the particular
175
jurisdiction.
Nimmer’s test also undermines the goals of copyright law because
it will deter the creation of new copyrightable expression. Copyright
170. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 8 (“It is noteworthy that the first argument
proffered, which referred to James Madison’s comments in the Federalist Papers, was
the importance of ‘promot[ing] national uniformity and . . . avoid[ing] the practical
difficulties of determining and enforcing an author’s rights under the differing laws
and in the separate courts of the various States.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,
at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745)).
171. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12)
(“The basis of a right of publicity claim concerns the message—whether the plaintiff
endorses, or appears to endorse the product in question.”).
172. See id. (acknowledging that some utilizations, particularly those of a sexual
nature, can be perceived as both expressive and commercial).
173. Compare Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1028 (3d. Cir 2008) (deciding
the preemption issue in favor of Facenda because his contract did not explicitly
agree to any commercial use of his name or likeness), with Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal.
App. 4th 1911, 1924 (Cal. App. Ct. 1996) (looking to CBS’s interest in a copyrighted
film to decide that Fleet could not prevent the distribution of the film based on a
right of publicity claim).
174. See Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 17 (asserting that contracts will play an
increasingly important role in copyright disputes because the rapid pace of
technological changes, the rise of the Internet, and attempts of copyright owners to
place restrictions on digital infringements will prompt personal contracts “to take up
where state-of-the-art restrictions on copying leave off”). Hardy then argues that
contracts play an important role in copyright law because the Copyright Act cannot
keep pace with the rapid rise of copyright disputes related to digital media;
therefore, individual contracts try to fill in the gap. Id. However, this development
will also lead to disputes related to the copyright preemption of state contracts.
Id. ¶ 3.
175. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (opining that allowing individual state courts to change the extent of
copyright protection will undermine the purpose of a uniform copyright system).
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protection seeks to increase public access to works of authorship by
176
However,
incentivizing individuals to produce new works.
Nimmer’s test threatens this incentive system by placing a state right
on par with a federal copyright and making it just as likely that a state
177
claim will trump a federal copyright claim.
The Third Circuit
warned in Facenda that an increased willingness of courts to uphold
right of publicity claims could unfairly limit the ability of copyright
178
owners to exercise their exclusive rights.
Furthermore, allowing a celebrity to succeed in a publicity claim
based upon a brief appearance in a copyrighted work is likely to
encourage litigation and make copyright owners fearful of preparing
179
future derivative works. With the risk of potential litigation from a
myriad of celebrities who appear in any portion of the original work,
copyright holders are likely to limit the extent to which they use the
original copyright to create further derivative works for public
180
dissemination.
2.

The test conflicts with First Amendment jurisprudence
The application of First Amendment law to copyrighted expression
reveals a second shortcoming of Nimmer’s framework:
181
it inappropriately limits freedom of expression.
Nimmer’s test
176. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994) (“The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.” (internal quotations omitted”).
177. Cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I]–[II],
at 1-88.2(9)–(21) (declining to give more weight to the copyright claim based on its
federal status). Under Nimmer’s theory, if the commercial use of the copyrighted
work was not explicit in the artist’s original contract, the state right should have the
potential to defeat the federal right based upon contract principles. Id.
178. The court noted that:
Despite our holding, we emphasize that courts must circumscribe the right
of publicity so that musicians, actors, and other voice artists do not get a
right that extends beyond commercial advertisements to other works of
artistic expression. If courts fail to do so, then every record contract or
movie contract would no longer suffice to authorize record companies and
movie studios to distribute their works.
Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1032 (3d Cir. 2008).
179. See Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 6 (arguing that the failure of
courts to preempt right of publicity claims will lead to “increased litigation because
those who use copyrighted works cannot predict the consequences of a particular
course of conduct and adjust their conduct accordingly”).
180. Cf. Goldman, supra note 68, at 607 (highlighting that state right of publicity
claims will undermine the incentive system that is established in copyright law).
181. Cf. id. at 616–17 (arguing that the attempt to draw a line between commercial
and non-commercial speech in First Amendment jurisprudence is not easy and,
“[c]onsequently, some expression that should be immune from liability goes
unprotected”).
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attempts to place all works with commercial elements in a category of
copyrightable expression that merit less than the full extent of
182
The test requires courts to decide whether a
federal protection.
work is an “expressive work promulgated for its own sake” or whether
183
it is a work produced for a commercial advertising purpose.
Yet, the Supreme Court, as well as Nimmer, has recognized the
difficulty in separating commercial expression from non-commercial
184
expression. Furthermore, Nimmer fails to give a clear definition of
a “commercial use,” and he does not present a method to distinguish
185
between an entertainment and commercial use.
While Nimmer
rationalizes courts’ past decisions on preemption disputes by drawing
186
a dichotomy between an expressive and a commercial use, this
rationale will not help courts decide cases where a work may have
both a commercial and an expressive purpose.
3.

The test fails to properly balance the interests served by the federal
copyright law and state publicity laws
Finally, Nimmer’s test does not appropriately balance the strength
of federal claims in the face of competing state claims. While
Nimmer’s test allows for outcomes that favor both copyright claims
and right of publicity claims, it does not properly consider the
187
There are legitimate
competing state and federal interests.

182. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11)
(considering a video, images, photos, voice over, and a robotic cartoon that were
used in commercial advertisements as clearly on the side of “commercial
exploitations” rather than considering the potential that these works could also be
“expressive works,” which should trigger preemption according to his framework).
183. Id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(15).
184. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(explaining that commercial elements and artistic elements in a work are often
intertwined, as was the case with a professional speech that was not necessarily purely
commercial even though it related to a financial motivation); see also 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) (admitting that
“some utilizations straddle the line” between expressive and commercial uses of a
copyrighted work). But see 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I],
at 1-88.2(13) (arguing that very few cases “fall outside of this dichotomy” of
expressive and commercial purposes).
185. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11)
(examining sixteen cases that courts have already decided and listing those cases in
which the copyright succeeded as expressive uses of the copyright and those which
the copyright claim failed as commercial uses; however, Nimmer does not provide a
definition of what is an expressive work and what is a commercial work).
186. See id. (listing seven works that he considers commercial and then listing nine
examples of works that he considers pure entertainment).
187. See id. at 1-88.2(11)–(12) (listing various cases where a right of publicity was
both upheld and preempted, but failing to discuss the federal or state interests
served in each of the cases).
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188

interests in a state right of publicity claim, but the facts of each case
should be carefully considered to determine if the individual
celebrity’s interest should trump the public interest served by the
189
federal copyright system.
The Copyright Act is an explicit
extension of the Constitution’s mandate to promote the development
190
As the Constitution is the supreme law of the
of science and art.
land, there should be a strong state interest asserted before a state law
can curtail the constitutional interests served by copyright
191
protection.
While the right of publicity’s interest in protecting an
individual’s rights against government interests is robust in our legal
192
system, the constitutional goal of increasing public awareness
through the creative arts should outweigh a celebrity’s profit interest
193
except in cases of obvious exploitation.
C. Problems Applying Nimmer’s Test to Current Media
The application of Nimmer’s test to modern media further reveals
the flaws in his preemption framework. Advertisements are no
194
longer purely in the form of short television commercials. Our era
of TiVo, DVR, and commercial fast forwarding leaves the traditional

188. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977)
(discussing the reasoning behind the creation of the right of publicity laws, including
a protection against unjust enrichment).
189. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974
(10th Cir. 1996) (arguing that “the inducements generated by publicity rights are
not nearly as important as those created by copyright and patent law,” and that there
is an even smaller incentive effect in the right of publicity when it is claimed in the
context of parodies).
190. See Association of Research Libraries, supra note 31 (asserting that the
Constitution gives Congress the power to protect copyrights, and the “First Congress
implemented the copyright provision of the U.S. Constitution in 1790” when it
created the first Federal Copyright Act of 1790).
191. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 623 (noting that, according to the Supremacy
Clause, “state law is preempted whenever it stands as an obstacle to the objectives of
federal law,” and that the interest afforded by the right of publicity directly conflicts
with the interests in the Copyright Act to incentivize the creation of new or derivative
works).
192. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV (explicitly listing what states shall not do
to individuals who fall within the Constitution’s protection).
193. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 250 (explaining that an additional reason to
hold in favor of the copyright owner when a contract is silent on derivative works
“is that it is more important to provide incentives for the creation of the original
work than for the actors to perform in the project”).
194. See Schejter, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that “today’s audiences are equipped
with enough choice and new technological advances that allow them to ignore
advertised messages by zapping to other channels or skipping them altogether with
the help of digital video recorders,” which sets the stage for a product placement to
replace traditional commercial advertisements).
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195

commercial advertisement less effective.
In response to this
technological change, cable networks and film producers increasingly
rely on product placement to gain financial benefit from their
196
entertainment works. The advertisement of “Tresemme” hair care
products in Project Runway and the display of “T-Mobile Sidekick”
phones in Bravo’s Top Chef demonstrate how entertainment works
197
incorporate commercial advertisements.
Nimmer’s proposal to
separate commercial uses from entertainment uses is difficult to
apply to those media works that straddle the line.
Cable shows are not the only media outlets that clandestinely
incorporate advertisements into entertainment. Literary works also
highlight the difficulty in distinguishing between expressive and
commercial uses of a work. For example, when an author worked
with Bulgari Jewelry to write a detective novel about stolen Bulgari
198
jewelry and subsequently sold it to bookstores, the work arguably
had both a commercial and an expressive purpose.
Finally,
subliminal advertising has recently begun to pervade broadcast
199
200
news through the display of products on the news anchors’ desks.
The increased commingling of entertainment and commercial
works in the media burdens the application of Nimmer’s framework.
Nimmer fails to address how courts should resolve preemption

195. See id. (explaining that the ability to fast forward through traditional
commercials has prompted cable networks to include advertising in the shows that
they air); see also Rose, supra note 3 (asserting that “for the brands, [product
placement] is a DVR-proof way of getting their message across and associating their
name with an established franchise”).
196. See Product Placement News Staff, TiVo Product Placement, PRODUCT
PLACEMENT NEWS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.productplacement.biz/2007031473/
News/Product-Placement/tivo-product-placement.html (revealing that TiVo has led
to “more insidious forms of marketing,” and even sells information about its
subscribers to marketers).
197. See Bravo Announces Sponsors for Project Runway Season 5, THE FUTON CRITIC,
Jul. 14, 2008, http://www.thefutoncritic.com/news.aspx?id=20080714bravo02 (listing
Tresemme, Bluefly, Saturn, and L’Oreal Paris as advertising sponsors whose products
will appear throughout Project Runway).
198. See Richard Alan Nelson, The Bulgari Connection: A Novel Form of Product
Placement, 10 J. PROMOTION MANAGEMENT 203, 203 (2004), available at
http://www.haworthpress.com/store/ArticleAbstract.asp?sid=CH4DRNNF1P819PC4
Q3HK3K8S3CVS6AV1&ID=45825 (explaining that the jewelry store worked with an
author to create a novel, which featured the Bulgari products).
199. See, e.g., Abigail Goldman, Eye-Opener with a Pitch, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 21,
2008, at 1 (explaining that news stations in Chicago, Seattle, New York and Las Vegas
have been known to use product placement in their broadcasts, and journalism
trainers worry that this practice could lead to a slippery slope in which advertising
companies begin to control news coverage).
200. See id. (reporting that “[t]he anchors aren’t even supposed to acknowledge
[the coffee drinks] . . . [so] . . . [t]hey get into your mind without you knowing it”).
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disputes when a copyrighted work incorporates an entertainment use
201
and commercial use. This failure reveals that Nimmer’s test will be
increasingly difficult to apply as product placement becomes more
202
prevalent in our society.
D. Problems Applying Nimmer’s Test to Facenda
Although it is easy to critique Nimmer’s framework by posing
hypothetical entertainment works, a reexamination of the facts of
Facenda also reveals the inadequacies of his framework considering
that the Third Circuit could have come down on either side of the
preemption dispute based on Nimmer’s framework. The title
“Making of Madden,” combined with the broadcast of the film
directly before the release of the videogame, makes it difficult
203
to deny the commercial purpose of the NFL’s film.
The Third
204
However, the Third
Circuit agreed, calling it an “infomercial.”
Circuit admitted that the film was not equivalent to a traditional
205
commercial.
A viewer could have looked to the length,
information, and creative choices in the film to conclude that the
206
film was similar to an artistic documentary or a “Docu-drama.”
Nimmer concedes that had the court accepted defendant’s
characterization of that 22-minute film as a documentary, it would
207
have accorded the work protection and denied the publicity claim.
Similarly, the Third Circuit might have seen the film’s commentary
from coaches and the game’s producers as descriptive and
informative. Under this perspective, the film could be likened to a

201. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(13)
(recognizing that some cases would straddle the commercial and entertainment
dichotomy, but concluding that these cases would be an exception to the general
framework).
202. See Laura Petrecca, Product Placement—You Can’t Escape It, USA TODAY, Oct.
11, 2006, at 1B–2B ( “It’s advertising ad nauseam. And it’s getting worse. . . . [T]his
year, marketers will spend a record $175 billion on ads in major media, such as TV,
radio, print, outdoor, movie theaters and the Internet . . . [u]p 5% over 2005.”).
203. See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1011–17 (3d. Cir 2008) (recounting
that the NFL created the film just prior to the release of the videogame, and that the
film had commentary from both the game’s creators and players from the NFL).
204. See id. at 1017 (agreeing with the plaintiff’s assertion that the film is similar to
a “late night, half-hour-long ‘infomercial’”).
205. See id. (explaining that this infomercial “presents a novel issue, because the
program is not a traditional 30- or 60-second television advertisement”).
206. See Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining
that a “Docu-drama” is an art form entailing the “dramatization of an historical event
or lives of real people,” and it “partakes of author’s license—it is a creative
interpretation of reality”).
207. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][ii], at 1-88.2(13).
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movie editorial, such as the one in Hoffman v. Capital Cities, where
the editorial nature of the copyrighted article about the film Tootsie
209
preempted Dustin Hoffman’s opposing right of publicity claim.
However, the Third Circuit deferred to the district court’s description
210
of the film as an infomercial, and because Facenda’s contract did
not agree to such uses of his voice, the NFL could not defeat
211
litigation when it produced a derivative work based on the films.
The issue is not that the Third Circuit was right or wrong, but
rather that the court could have easily come out on either side of the
212
debate using Nimmer’s framework. Thus, this Comment adopts the
same critique of Nimmer’s test that he makes of other preemption
213
frameworks: “[t]here has to be a better way.” This better solution
requires looking beyond the paradigm of copyright law and
proposing a new test that adequately details how courts can
consistently determine when a state or federal infringement claim
should prevail.
III. RECOMMENDING A MODIFIED PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK THAT
DRAWS UPON TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE
To promote the goals of uniformity, clarity, and protection for
original expression, a preemption test should allow celebrities and
copyright holders to predict whether a derivative work is likely to
214
receive the full extent of federal copyright protection. Only if such
parties can predetermine if their investments in future works are
215
going to prove worthwhile, rather than fail in litigation, will the
208. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
209. See id. at 1189 (holding that Dustin Hoffman could not prevent the release of
a periodical—containing mostly editorial commentary—related to the movie Tootsie
merely because it contained a digitized image of Hoffman as Tootsie that the actor
did not agree to in his movie contract).
210. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1017 (listing various factors that made the program
appear like an infomercial).
211. See id. at 1012 (explaining that Facenda’s written contract with NFL Films
explicitly stated that the NFL could use the video recordings of him “by whatever
media or manner NFL Films . . . sees fit, provided, however, such use does not
constitute an endorsement of any product or service”).
212. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 68, at 617 (explaining that the attempt to
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech is not an easy task and
often leads to inadequate First Amendment protection for speech with some
commercial elements).
213. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(9).
214. See generally Kreiss, supra note 36, at 9 (explaining that copyright law seeks to
provide a clear incentive system so that authors can be assured that they will be
compensated for their efforts to produce new or derivative works).
215. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 6–11 (explaining how the copyright system is
primarily based on financial incentives).
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public continue to see the robust development of new creative
216
works.
The recommended test helps fulfill these goals by providing
specific factors that courts, celebrities, and copyright holders can
apply to any potential use of an original or derivative copyrighted
work. By incorporating a concern for a public consumer’s response
to a derivative work, this proposal will help all parties involved to
determine whether a proposed use of derivative work is within the
reasonable exercise of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and
within the reasonable expectations of the celebrity appearing in the
original work.
A. The Recommended Test Incorporates Trademark Law’s Concern for a
Consumer’s Perspective
This recommended solution asks one question: is the derivative
work so comparable to the original work that the copyright holder
217
acted within the reasonable expectations of the celebrity?
If the
derivative work is similar to the original work in which the celebrity
agreed to participate, then the celebrity should not be able to
denounce the derivative work as an unauthorized exploitation of his
218
name or likeness.
In contrast, if the derivative work advances a
substantially different form and message that the copyright holder
should know the celebrity could not anticipate, then the copyright
holder should not be able to exploit the celebrity through such a
219
derivative work.
In determining the potential for unreasonable commercial
exploitation of an artist, courts should not only make their own
216. See supra Part II.B.1 (noting that public benefit and public access to artistic
works are the goals of the federal copyright system and the U.S. Constitution).
217. See generally 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II],
at 1-88.2(16)–(20) (agreeing that it is critical that a proposal for a preemption test
should ensure that the derivative use of the celebrity’s identity is similar to the
original use). Thus, this proposed test, like Nimmer’s test, seeks to protect
the interests and expectations of the celebrity. Id. at § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I],
at 1-88.2(9)–(16).
218. Cf. id. at § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.7(17)–(20) (agreeing that it is
reasonable that a copyright owner should be able to produce derivative works that
are the type of work that the celebrity originally contracted to produce in the first
place). Nimmer uses this rationale to explain why an actor who agreed to participate
in a film should not be able to sue under a right of publicity claim when the very
same film is broadcasted on television. Id.
219. See generally Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 6 (arguing that in
order to establish a predictable preemption solution, a copyright claim should
preempt a right of publicity claim, except in cases where the use goes beyond the
mere right to distribute, perform, or display a copyrighted work).
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determination of physical similarity between the works, but also
220
consider a consumer’s overall reaction to the works. This addition
of a consumer focus is in line with copyright law’s concern for the
public interest and the right of publicity’s presumption that the
221
viewer perceives some aspect of the celebrity.
Trademark
jurisprudence’s test for the likelihood of confusion between two
marks provides several specific factors that courts use to determine if
viewers would perceive a substantial similarity between the original
222
and derivative works.
Courts usually apply this trademark test to
goods; nevertheless, it is possible to modify the test to compare
223
copyrighted works.
The incorporation of elements from one area
224
of the law to another is not uncommon. Thus, it is not surprising
that trademark jurisprudence may assist copyright law.
220. See Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir. 1958)
(articulating that a trademark can confuse a consumer not only through visual
similarity but also when “it conveys the same idea, or stimulates the same mental
reaction, or has the same meaning”).
221. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that the foundation of Bette Midler’s claim lay in the fact that a listener
would associate the defendant’s song with the persona of Midler, even though it was
not her voice).
222. J. Thomas McCarthy notes that:
Similarity is not limited to the eye or ear. The mental impact of a similarity
in meaning may be so pervasive as to outweigh any visual or phonetic
differences. That is, the ‘psychological imagery evoked by the respective
marks’ may overpower the respective similarities or differences in
appearance and sound.
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
§ 23:26, at 23–139 (4th ed. 2009) (quoting Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co.,
390 F.2d 724, 156 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (Smith, J., dissenting)). The Ninth Circuit listed
the following factors for trademark infringement guidance:
the similarity of the conflicting designations; relatedness or proximity of the
two . . . products or services; strength of [plaintiff’s] mark; the marketing
channels used; degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in
selecting goods; [defendant’s] intent in selecting its mark; evidence of actual
confusion; and likelihood of expansion in product lines.
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entmn’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053
(9th Cir. 1999).
223. Cf. Kellogg v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 114 (1938) (holding that two
shredded wheat cartons were not inappropriately similar because the competitor’s
carton contained three more biscuits than the plaintiff’s, the competitor’s cartons
did not resemble the plaintiff’s cartons in “size, form, or color,” the labels were
strikingly different, and the competitor’s biscuit was about “two-thirds the size of the
plaintiff’s” biscuit).
224. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 222, § 6:14, at 6–33 (clarifying that copyright
and trademark law “may overlap to give protection to different aspects of a single
item. For example, a picture of a person or character is copyrightable as a pictorial
work and may also be used as a mark to identify the source of goods or services.”);
Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1541, 1552–54 (1968) (explaining that a computer program that is
copyrightable may also be patentable, thus, both forms of law can be applied to the
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To decide if the copyright holder acted within the reasonable
expectations of the celebrity, courts should look to six factors—
adapted from the trademark test for confusion—to make an overall
determination of similarity, as follows: (1) the prominence of the
celebrity in the original and derivative work, (2) the purpose of each
work, (3) the sight, sound, and plot of the two works, (4) whether the
two works were distributed through the same consumer marketing
channels, (5) the degree of care that the copyright holder used in
respecting the rights of the celebrity, and (6) the expanding use of
225
the derivative work for purely commercial purposes.
As in
trademark law, not all of the factors will be relevant in every case, and
226
the presence of one factor can make up for the lack of another.
This trademark test can help solve the copyright-preemption
dispute because it adds elements that focus on a consumer’s reaction
to the works rather than relying solely on subjective judicial
interpretation. In trademark disputes, courts compare the similarity
of two marks to determine whether the relevant consumer of a good
is likely to confuse two goods because the branding, packaging, or
227
symbols used to market the goods are too similar. The test’s focus
on the similarity of the product and the mind of the relevant
228
consumer is useful to the preemption debate in copyright law
because it will allow courts to determine if an individual viewer is
likely to find that the derivative work serves a similar purpose to the

dispute). But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003) (cautioning against “over-extension” of trademark law into the realm of
copyright protection (quoting Trafix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23, 29 (2001))).
225. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053 (listing the eight factors of the
trademark test for confusion in order to assess the similarity of two goods). Each of
the factors for the proposed test nearly mirrors the factors as put forth in Brookfield,
such as tangible similarity of the works and the market for distribution of the two
works. See id. However, the terms “product” and “good” are replaced with this test
for copyrighted work.
226. See Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int’l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198
(2d Cir. 1962) (explaining that the list for likelihood of confusion factors is not
exhaustive and that “the court may have to take still other variables into account”).
227. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053 (“The core element of trademark
infringement is the likelihood of confusion, i.e., whether the similarity of the marks
is likely to confuse customers about the source of the products.” (quoting Official
Airlines Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993))).
228. See, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 10
(1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that a likelihood of confusion claim in trademark law will
only be actionable if the confusion “exist[s] in the mind of a relevant person”
(quoting Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201,
1207 (1st Cir. 1983))).
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229

original copyrighted work.
Including the perspective of the
relevant viewer is critical in this preemption issue because the
celebrity should not be able to make a claim of commercial
exploitation if the public viewer does not associate the celebrity with
230
any commercial advertisement after exposure to the work.
B. The Recommended Framework Promotes the Interests of the Copyright
Owners and Celebrities
The proposed multi-factor test is more useful than Nimmer’s
preemption test because it promotes the three primary goals related
to copyright law. First, it protects the unified copyright system
because copyright owners will feel comfortable knowing that their
derivative work will receive federal protection, so long as it is
231
relatively similar to the original copyrighted work.
Unlike
Nimmer’s test, the recommended test does not involve choosing
232
between terms of a contract and federal copyright protection.
Copyright owners would have specific factors to predetermine the
233
reasonableness of the derivative work, allowing them to produce

229. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 253 (employing a similar focus on the
consumer’s mind in her proposal for a preemption test when she suggests that
“[i]f an image not only ‘reminds’ people of the right of publicity holder, but also
‘looks like’ the right of publicity holder, then the defendant has taken the expression
of the person’s identity, not merely the idea of that person”).
230. Cf. Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1143–46 (9th Cir. 2006)
(opining that Sony used Laws’s song as a sample in another song, and this use was
unlikely to be seen as an advertisement for any product); Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a picture of
Hoffman appearing in the magazine about the film Tootsie was akin to an expressive
editorial, and Hoffman’s picture was not used for commercial advertisement or
exploitation).
231. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing an exclusive right to control the use of
derivative works); see also Kreiss, supra note 36, at 14 (explaining that copyright is
about making money, and copyright owners must be assured that their derivative
works will receive federal copyright protection). The proposed test directly
compares the tangible similarities between the original and the derivative works, an
assessment that any author or copyright owner could make prior to using a
celebrity’s identity in a derivative work, rather than relying on a judicial
interpretation of the commercial/entertainment use of a work. See supra text
accompanying note 225 (proposing a six factor test for determining similarity
between two copyrighted works).
232. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(12)
(arguing that if the artist’s contract did not explicitly agree to a commercial
advertisement, the copyright owner should not be able to exercise the exclusive right
to produce a derivative work that might have an additional advertising purpose).
233. See supra Part III.A (listing the proposed factors for assessing the similarity
between two copyrighted works based on the “likelihood of confusion” test in
trademark law).
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additional works without fear of subjective interpretations of
234
copyright conflict preemption.
Second, the proposed test does not leave courts or copyright
owners with the impossible task of distinguishing between
235
commercial and entertainment expression.
This test does not
punish works merely because they are commercial; rather, it provides
proper protection for commercial works, as required by the First
236
Amendment.
The test also provides copyright owners with a clear
standard to evaluate whether their works will receive protection based
on objective comparisons of the original and derivative works, not on
subjective guesses between protected expression and commercial
237
exploitation.
Finally, the recommended test promotes the interests of the state
and federal legislatures by not precluding a celebrity from succeeding
238
in a right of publicity claim.
It allows a celebrity to overcome a
competing copyright claim where the derivative work or the use of
the work was unreasonably dissimilar to the original copyrighted
239
work.
This scenario promotes the interests behind the right of
publicity laws, including the prevention of unjust enrichment and
234. Compare Rothman, supra note 15, at 235 (explaining that when dealing with
copyright preemption issues some courts look to the deleted language of section 301
for guidance in preemption, while others turn to different areas of copyright law for
assistance), with 1 WILLIAM E. LEVIN, TRADE DRESS PROTECTION § 7:2 (2d ed. 2009)
(explaining that even though slight variances exist across courts when applying the
likelihood of confusion factors to individual cases, the majority of courts still rely on
the same list of factors, and multiple circuit courts have explicitly discussed the
importance of applying the likelihood of confusion test in a consistent manner).
235. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 68, at 616–17 (explaining that drawing the line
between commercial and non-commercial expression “is not that simple” and may
lead to under-protection of free speech).
236. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.
2001) (emphasizing that commercial speech receives “a measure of First
Amendment protection”); see also Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entmn’t
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (comparing the marketing channels in
the likelihood of confusion test). Looking to an evaluation of marketing channels in
both the trademark test and the modified test for copyright law reveals that the
proposed test would not preclude a copyright claim merely because the work might
be used to market goods or services to consumers.
237. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12)
(admitting that it is not always easy to draw a line between commercial and
entertainment uses of a work).
238. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (noting
the importance of the right of publicity claim because the failure to protect such a
claim may result in unjust enrichment).
239. Compare supra Part III.B (asserting that the right of publicity should not be
preempted if the derivative work seeks to promote an entirely different product or
access an entirely unrelated market), with 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) (agreeing that an artist should not be associated
with a commercial advertisement that was not in his original contract).
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240

commercial exploitation of celebrities.
However, this test also
recognizes the deference that a preemption solution should pay to a
competing federal copyright claim, based upon the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution and the inclusion of the Copyright Act’s
241
preemption clause. If the author did not create the derivative work
in bad faith and the work is reasonably similar to the original work,
242
the recommended test favors the copyright claim.
Ultimately, the
federal interest in a uniform system to incentivize new creative works
would dominate; however, a celebrity’s right of publicity claim can
243
triumph in a case of clear commercial exploitation.
While there are several advantages to the recommended test, there
remains some potential for conflicting outcomes in preemption
disputes. The multiple factors in the test provide courts with detailed
guidance in deciding the case; however, various jurisdictions might
choose to emphasize different factors, which may lead to inconsistent
244
application of the test. Moreover, any multi-factor test runs the risk
245
of becoming overly complex and tedious during litigation. Finally,
one could argue that, while Nimmer’s test gives courts the authority
to decide subjectively between a commercial and entertainment work,
the proposed test still allows a court to speculate how a consumer
246
would respond to the works. Despite these potential drawbacks, the
proposed test provides substantially more direction for courts and

240. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565 (noting that the purpose of the right of publicity
is to prevent unjust enrichment by using a celebrity’s work in a way that denies the
celebrity the ability to reap commercial benefit).
241. See supra Part I.A.2–3 (discussing the role of the Supremacy Clause in
copyright jurisprudence, and the inclusion of section 301 to ensure that a state law
does not conflict with federal copyright law).
242. See supra III.A (arguing that the degree of care the copyright holder uses in
respecting the rights of the celebrity is an important factor in assessing similarity).
243. Cf. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565 (providing an example of clear commercial
exploitation).
244. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1587, 1622–47 (2006) (arguing that there
continues to be a strong disparity across jurisdictions concerning how to apply the
multi-factor trademark test and explaining the discrepancy in interpretations of each
factor in the likelihood of confusion test).
245. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49,
66–69 (2008) (arguing that the problem with the likelihood of confusion test is that
the test itself is vague, and its application is time-consuming due to the “fact-intensive
nature” of the test).
246. See id. at 73–74 (arguing that the likelihood of confusion test is inappropriate
because it allows courts to arbitrarily give weight to multiple factors, none of which
gives appropriate consideration for expressive speech protected by the First
Amendment).
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more adequately promotes the incentive system in copyright law than
Nimmer’s framework.
C. Application of Recommended Test to Copyright-Preemption Disputes
Facenda provides an apt example of how the recommended test
could have helped the NFL determine the reasonableness of its
derivative use of Facenda’s voice. First, Facenda’s voice was very
prominent in the original work, and thus Facenda had a strong
247
interest in the future use of such copyrighted films.
Second, the
original film and the derivative videogame film did not have a similar
purpose, as the former focused only on NFL football games, while the
248
latter related to a consumer product. Third, the sound and visual
appearance of the two works were distinct: the original focused on
NFL players and coaches, while the derivative work featured long
249
segments with the game’s creators. Fourth, the marketing channels
250
The fifth
were similar because both works targeted football fans.
251
and sixth factors relating to bad faith are not clear in this case.
Finally, the expansion of the NFL’s sound recordings from pure
entertainment to a commercial purpose was evident because the
252
derivative use of the segments related to a consumer product. With
five out of seven factors showing a stark difference between the two
works, it is not surprising that the Third Circuit upheld Facenda’s
253
right of publicity claim.
In contrast to Facenda, the proposed test would not allow a right of
publicity claim to preempt a copyright claim where both works take
254
on a similar form and target viewers in a similar manner. Nimmer
255
analyzes Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., where Sony used a

247. See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing how
the NFL described Facenda’s voice in the original films as “distinctive, recognizable
[and] legendary” (internal quotations omitted)).
248. Id. at 1012.
249. See id. (noting that the program described the realism of the video game).
250. Id.
251. See id. (mentioning that the NFL might have originally referred to the film as
the “Madden Promo” during production, but then denied that the film was a
promotion in their testimonies).
252. See id. (explaining that in 2005 the NFL decided to create the “Making of
Madden NFL 06” film, while Facenda’s original films related solely to NFL
documentaries and not promotional videos).
253. Id. at 1033 (noting that the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute does not
conflict with federal copyright by protecting Facenda’s voice).
254. See supra Part III.A (noting the importance of the consumer’s perspective in
determining if a work is unreasonably commercially exploitive).
255. 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
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sample from Debra Laws’s sound recording in the background of a
256
Jennifer Lopez song. Both of Lopez’s and Laws’s works were voice
recordings released on albums, and Sony owned valid copyrights in
257
both works. Nimmer argues that Laws’s claim should be preempted
258
Under the proposed
because the Lopez song is not commercial.
test, the copyright claim also preempts Laws’s claim; however, it is not
necessary for a court to consider if the song has a commercial
purpose. It is enough that both the derivative work and the original
259
were songs released on albums to the general music consumer.
Laws agreed to sing for a song, and Sony simply exerted its right to
260
use that voice recording in a song.
261
Finally, in Wendt v. Host International, Inc., Nimmer explains that a
celebrity’s right of publicity claim should not be preempted where an
anamatronic figure of a Cheers television character, Norm, was used
for the commercial purpose of luring customers into an airport
262
restaurant.
In contrast to Nimmer’s conclusion, under the
proposed test the right of publicity would be preempted because the
copyright owner was merely exercising the right to create
derivative works based upon the copyrighted Cheers character.
The anamatronic figure was visually similar to the original
copyrighted character, and was marketed at fans of the copyrighted
show Cheers. The allure of the figurine depended upon its association
with the copyrighted character Norm, not with the exploitation of the
personality of the actor, Wendt. As such, the anamatronic derivative
work was reasonably similar to the copyrighted work, and the actor
should reasonably expect that the copyright might give rise to such
derivative works.

256. Id. at 1136.
257. Id.
258. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(16)–
(20) (explaining that, because the use of the copyrighted sound recording in
Lopez’s song constituted an expressive use, the copyright claim would not be
preempted by Laws’s right of publicity).
259. See supra Part III.A (explaining that the proposed test focuses on the
similarity of the product and the mind of the relevant consumer rather than the
commercial use of the work).
260. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(16)–
(20).
261. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
262. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.1, 188.2(9)–(15) (explaining that the use of the Cheers animatronic figures, which
resembled the image of Wendt, were used solely for “commercial exploitation” in
order to attract customers into a restaurant).
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The recommended test provides a clearer standard to determine
whether a copyrighted work will preempt a state right of publicity.
Where Nimmer’s test fails to promote the general goals relating to
creative copyrighted works, this test protects original expression, so
long as the derivative use is similar to the original use of the
263
264
The recommended test methodically allows
celebrity’s persona.
copyright owners to determine if a court is likely to recognize the
derivative creation as part of the exclusive right to prepare derivative
265
works in the Copyright Act. Thus, the test promotes the production
of creative works, while recognizing celebrities’ right to limit the
unfair exploitation of their identities.
CONCLUSION
Although Nimmer’s preemption framework might be alluring to
courts struggling to find clarity in the copyright-preemption debate,
courts should resist the temptation to adopt his framework.
Nimmer’s call for courts to decide when a copyright should preempt
a competing right of publicity—based on a subjective judicial
determination of what constitutes a commercial use and an
expressive use—undermines the goals of the Copyright Act, the First
Amendment, and the Constitution.
Instead, courts should determine preemption cases based on the
reasonable expectations of copyright owners and celebrities. This
determination requires considering the similarity between the
original and derivative use and incorporating a consumer’s reaction
to the works. The recommended test, adopted from trademark law,
provides a clearer standard to determine whether a copyrighted work
will trump a state right of publicity. The test provides a six-prong
approach that protects artistic expression, so long as it is not
exploitative.
It also reduces the need for subjective judicial
interpretations of works and offers tangible factors that copyright
owners might consider before investing the time and money to
produce a derivative work. While the increased presence of Bollinger
champagne and Aston Martin cars in James Bond films might
increase our inclination for expensive goods, the recommended test
263. See supra Part III.B (proposing a new test to balance the rights of celebrities
against the right to create original works).
264. See id. (listing six factors that copyright owners and courts can evaluate to
determine if the original work is sufficiently similar to the derivative work).
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing copyright owners the exclusive right to
create and control the use of derivative works).
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ensures that it will not suppress our access to future Bond-related
films and products.

